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THE POWER OF THE JUDICIARY TO DECLARE A
LAW UNCONSTITUTIONVAL.
The judiciary has no power to declare a law unconstitutional unless it conflicts with some provision of the State or
Federal Constitution.
It will be the purpose of this article to show the reasonableness and meaning of this principle.
To many lawyers a discussion of the subject will appear
unnecessary, because the doctrine stated seems perfectly established by the decisions.
But it has been recently disputed by high authority. Judge
COOLEY, in the preface to the second edition of his able work
on Constitutional Limitations, says that he has endeavored to

point out "that there are on all sides definite limitations
which circumscribe the legislative authority independent of
the specific restrictions which the people impose by their
State Constitutions." And similar views are maintained by
Judge REDFIELD, in the American Law Register for March,
1871, p. 161 et seq.
And some courts which assert the principle for which we
contend, in the most unqualified terms, aussert, also, as a provision of constitutional law, not founded upon any specific
constitutional inhibitions, the doctrine that taxation can be
only for a public purpose, and that an attempt to tax for a
private purpose is void.
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That, as a matter of justice, taxation should be employed
only for a public purpose, that is, a purpose which the community taxed is interested in accomplishing, is so obvious a
truism that we presume it was never doubted. Probably no

legislator ever voted for an act imposing taxation, except on
the ground that it would conduce to some purpose which he
deemed public.
But obviously just as is the principle, its assertion by the
judiciary as a test by which to try the validity of acts of the
legislature, is inconsistent with the doctrine that no act of
the legislature can be declared void, except in conflict with
some specific constitutional provision. It is said that the
very definition of taxation shows that it must be for a public
purpose, and that an attempt to tax for an object not public
is not taxation, but robbery, and, therefore, void. This is
plainly limiting the power of the legislature by the definition
of a word-a definition made by the lexicographer, or by the
usage which he followed in giving the definition.
Where the validity of an act of the legislature depends
upon the interpretation of a constitutional provision, it may
depend upon the definition of the words used in such provision; but to assert that in any other case an act of the legis.
lature can be controlled by definitions of words not used in
it, is to set up a standard of judgment outside of the written
Constitution.
Most of the courts which assert as a principle of constitutional law that taxation must. be for a public purpose, qualify
the assertion by saying that the matter is so far within the
legislative discretion that if the taxation in question can in
any degree be promotive of the public welfare, then the legislative decision is conclusive upon the courts. This qualification, consistently adhered to, takes away almost all
practical power from the assertion of the principle; for the

legislature will, perhaps, never vote the public money except for some object which they claim to be public, and it
can very seldom, if ever, happen that a court can say as a
matter of law that the expenditure authorized can, by no
possibility, be beneficial to the public.

But the assertion of the principle with the qualification is
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still in direct conflict with the doctrine that no act of the
legislature can be declared void unless in conflict with some
specific constitutional provision, and it has given occasion for
some courts to pass from the assertion of a principle thus
practically unimportant to the announcement of doctrines
having a most important practical bearing upon the respective powers of the judicial and legislative departments of
government.
In the recent cases of WVhite v. The Sheboygan R. R. Co., 9
Am. L. R., N. S. 156, and The People v. Salem, 9 Am. L. R.,
N. S. 487, S. C., 20 Mich. 452, the highest courts of Wisconsin and Michigan have declared that the giving of public
money to private corporations, to aid in the building of railroads, is unconstitutional. They did not undertake to determine that the railroads to be built could by no possibility
benefit the communities to be taxed, but they say in effect
that the manner devised by the legislature of accomplishing'
the public benefit sought is unconstitutional.
In the case of the GarrardCounty Court v. Kentucky River
Navigation Company, 10 Am. L. R., N. S. 151, the highest court
of Kentucky held that the improvement of a navigable river
was not of such local public benefit as to sustain an act of the
legislature, authorizing the County of Garrard, through
which the river runs, to tax. itself for this purpose. The
court, in this case, did not undertake .to say that the improvement in question would not be a local benefit to Garrard
county, but that it would not be such a local benefit as would
justify county taxation.
If the principles sought to be established by these courts
are sound, then courts, independent of specific constitutional
restrictions, can determine, at least negatively, what objects
are of sufficient public importance to justify taxation, and
also the manner in which the public aid may be afforded.
They can thus determine the objects of government, since
only bytaxation can any governmental object b3 accomplished,
and the method by which these objects shall be carried out.
The importance of the principles thus announced is shownby
the fact that while there is the greatest unanimity in the view
that taxation should be used only for a public purpose, there
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is the greatest variety in opinion and practice as to the objects for which the public should undertake to provide and
the manner in which the needed provision should be made.
If these matters are all to be left to the final determination of
the judiciary, it will constitute a great enlargement of their
powers.
Another limitation upon the power of the legislature is
derived by some courts fr6m the constitutional provision by
which the powers of government are divided into legislative,
judicial and executive, and the officials of each department
are vested with its powers. It is conceded by all that this
provision excludes the legislature from exercising judicial or
executive powers, since these powers are granted to other de.
partments. It is further said that under this provision the
Legislature can exercise only legislative powers, and this
also we admit, since there are no other powers known to government save judicial and executive, and from these the legislativeis excluded. But it is further contended that legislative
power is something less than the power of making any law
which the legislature deem proper-that there are restrictions
upon it not contained in specific constitutional inhibitions,
but derived from the principles of justice or the nature of
free government. If these restrictions were founded at all on
the meaning of legislative power, then, as based on a constitutional provision, they would not be opposed to the doctrine
for which we contend, but legislative power so clearly means
the power of making laws irrespective of the subjects or the
character of the laws, that it is idle to find limitations in these
words. The limitations sought to be found here are, then,
clearly outside of any constitutional provision, and must fall,
if the judiciary have no power to declare an act void unless
in conflict with some provision of the Constitution.
We have thus far undertaken to show the danger which
exists of the infringement of the principle with which we
sarted. We now proceed to our main purpose of showing
its meaning and reasonableness. And first, of its meaning.
1. It does not mean that. an act of the legislature cannot
be declared void unless expressly forbidden by some constitutional provision. An implied prohibition may be as clear
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as an express one, and if so, should be as certainly enforced.
But in such cases, the provision which contains the implication should be pointed out, and the implication should be
derived only from a fair interpretation of the language
used.
2. It does not imply that all proper limitations of legislative power are found in the Federal Constitution and that of
any State. There may be other limitations of great importance, whose justice seems perfectly evident to all clear-headed
political reasoners. Such limitations should be urged upon
the legislature with such force as their merits deserve. If
disregarded, and the evil which results is wide-spread and
great, the people should be urged to introduce into their constitutions the needed limitations.
3. It does not imply that the legislature may not do injustice not forbidden by the Constitution. Scarcely any law of
general application is passed which does not do injustice to
some one. And a law which operates in the fairest possible
way will often seem unjust to those whom it burdens. It
does, however, imply that the injustice in such cases is one
as to which there is no relief from the determina'tion of the
legislature. The highest courts will often seem to suitors to
commit great injustice, but from their decisions there is no
appeal. And the injustice which comes through laws not
forbidden by the Constitution, is an injustice which the courts
have no right to remedy.
4. It does not imply that the citizen is always bound to
obey every act of the legislature not in conflict with some
provision of the constitution. An act not unconstitutional
may be so unjust as to justify the exercise of the right of
revolution, or it may be so ridiculous as to justify treating
it with silent contempt. If an act of the legislature of New
York should impose upon the city of New York, for municipal purposes, a tax which in one year should equal the entire
value of all the propertY in the city, this would justify rebellion. If the same legislature should pass an act prescribing particularly the fashion in which each inhabitant of the
city should dress, it would properly be treated with utter
neglect and contempt. But in ucither case, in the absence of
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constitutional provisions upon the subject, would there be
any rightful appeal to the judiciary.
5. The principle for which we contend does mean that in
deciding upon the constitutionality of an act of the legisla.
ture, the judiciary are confined to an interpretation of the
act, and to an interpretation of the specific constitutional
clauses which the act is alleged to infringe, and that only
where the fair interpretation of the latter is in conflict with
the fair interpretation of the former, can the act be set aside,
and that to this rule there are absolutely no exceptions. It
confines the work of the judiciary to that which is alone
their proper province, viz., the work of interpreting the law,
and applying it to the facts of the case before them.
The reasonableness of the rule that the judiciary cannot
declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless in
conflict with some specific provision of the Constitution, will
appear from comparing the arguments in its favor with those
against it.
The arguments in its favor .can be reduced to these:
1. It is impossible to find any satisfactory basis for the
existence of a power in the judiciary to declare void acts of
the legislature, except as they are in conflict with the written
Constitution. The power to set aside acts of the legislative
body does not to belong the judiciary in England. It is, we
believe, of purely American growth. It is wholly derived
from the written constitution established here. It was first
asserted as a necessary implication from the fact that the
written constitutions are declared to be the supreme law, and
must, as a consequence, render nugatory any legislative act
in conflict with them. The duty of the judiciary to interpret the law made it necessary for them to interpret both the
legislative act and the supreme law of the Constitution, and
where there was a conflict, to declare the pre-eminence of the
latter. The power of the judiciary to set aside acts of the
legislature being thus wholly derived from written constitutions, must fail where these fail. It cannot be extended beyond the source from which it had its origin.
2. The rule which we seek to maintain is the only one
which can give that certainty, which is one of the very high-
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est requisites of human law. It is as important that those
who must suffer the consequences of a mistake as to the law,
should be able to ascertain what it is bcfore acting, as that
the law should be wise and just.
But if acts of the legislature can be set aside by the judiciary ba-ause in conflict with fundamental principles not
expressed in the written constitutions, who is able authoritatively to declare what these principles are-what the judiciary
in a given case will decide them to be? How can the legislature know when they are keeping within the proper boundaries, and so making, laws which will stand? And where
shall the judiciary themselves look to ascertain these principles ? If they say that legislative power does not extend to
the making of all laws not forbidden by the Constitution,
where is the line which shall divide those which are within
the legislative power, from those which are without it? Is
usage to determine this line? If so, what must be the nature
and extent and duration of this usage? If it lies in the
power of the judiciary, independent of constitutional provisions, to say that a certain method of accomplishing a purpose acknowledged to be public, is unlawful, though adopted
by the legislature, or that certain objects which the legislature have determined to be worthy of public support are beyond the sphere of governmental aid, where will they find
the line which is to separate the methods or the objects which
are unlawful from those which are not? It will be admitted
that no such line can be found, and that no principle can be
stated upon which the judiciary will agree, which will determine the limits of the power claimed. The consequence is
that the assertion of such indefinite power throws the whole
subject of constitutional law into confusion and uncertainty.
We venture to say that a large proportion of the difficult
questions of constitutional law existing to-day, arise out of
the attempt of the judiciary to cet up some standard of judgment outside of the written Constitution. The practical consequences of this uncertainty are disastrous. Legislatures
must legislate upon subjects, or in methods which transgress
some men's notions of the proper sphere of government.
Business must be done based upon this legislation. Either
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it must go forward subject to the risk of being all set aside
by judicial decision, or it must be suspended until judicial
decision has been obtained. The evil of either course may
be very great.
3. It is only by maintaining the rule that the judiciary
cannot declare an act of the legislature void unless it is in
-onflict with some provision of the written Constitution, that
the line between legislative and judicial powers can be kept
ap. Tfe separation of these powers, and the intrusting of
them to difibrent classes of officials, are regarded as very important by all our political writers. If the judiciary may set
aside acts of the legislature because in conflict with principles whose determination is left to their sole unguided judgments, what hinlers them from gradually assuming the power
of putting a negative upon every act of the legislature, which,
in their judgment, is unjust or unwise, and so having a very
large control over the legislative power? The tendency of
all men is to put the largest interpretation upon their own
powers. This tendency in the legislature or executive may
be checked by the judiciary. But what, save a strict adherence to the written Constitution, can check the judiciary?
The arguments against the view of constitutional law
which we seek to maintain seem reducible to this one. The
legislature will pass laws not forbidden by the provisions
of the written Constitution, which are yet so unjust, or so
contrary to the theory of free governments, as to do great
evil, and the evil can be restrained only by giving the judiciary power to declare such laws void. This argument assumes that the judiciary are better judges than the legislatures
of the principles of government, or of justice, and that the
decisions of legislatures upon these subjects are not to be
trusted-an assumption which, as a matter of fact, is sometimes true, and sometimes not true, but which at any rate
cymes with a very poor grace from the judiciary. It is
fbiandcd on a distrust of our theory of government, which
commits the making of its laws to men who are often quite ignorant of many things which law-makers should know.
'e
do not doubt that legislatures may often (do much evil by the
passage of acts not in conflict with tei provisions of the Con-

